My research is primarily concerned with understanding the metaphysically significant content of our best scientific theories. This has led me to investigate the prospects of using indispensability arguments for traditional ontological questions like whether there are composite objects. Here are some of my papers.
Publications:
What Are Empirical Consequences? On Dispensability and Composite Objects. Synthese, 2021.
In this paper, I argue against a recent composite object indispensability argument. Thomas Hofweber (2018, 2019) has argued that our scientific theories straightforwardly confirm the existence of composite objects. The idea is that experiments, like whether some particular metal bar is conductive, appeal to composite objects like metal bars (rather than just microphysical particles acting in concert). From this, Hofweber infers that composite objects make an empirical difference and that they are indispensable. I consider what happens when we take Hofweber seriously on his claim that this sort of “thick”' metaphysical content makes an empirical difference. I argue that it overgenerates cases of indispensability. It turns out that faces in the night sky could be indispensable to our best theories, which I take to be an intolerable result.
Works in Progress:
No Science Without Composites. Under Review.
In this paper, I present an indispensability argument for the existence of composite objects. This argument relies on a widely held principle about ontological commitment. Philosophers (Dorr, Sider, Hofweber) have recently debated whether composite are indispensable to our best scientific theories. My argument differs from these in the sense that I consider the role that certain properties play in our scientific theories. I present examples of properties that play essential explanatory roles in our best microbiology, and I argue that these properties are had only by composite objects. My argument is one that philosophers of science and scientifically inclined metaphysicians should take seriously.
On Dispensability and Indispensability. Under Review.
Many philosophers present dispensability or indispensability arguments that presuppose a specific conception of dispensability. The present paper explores and critiques the reigning conception of dispensability. In particular, I argue that it entails that too many things are dispensable to our best scientific theories. This entailment is at odds with the purpose for which we seek a conception of dispensability. In light of my arguments, I present a positive proposal that radically shifts our understanding of how dispensability and indispensability arguments work. This new proposal demands a metaphysics of science that splits the difference between pure empiricism and pure rationalism.
Title Redacted. Under Review.
Hilary Putnam (2012) believed that mathematical claims are objectively true but that there are no mathematical objects. There are some initial problems with Putnam's position. First, it seems inconsistent with the conclusion of the so-called Quine-Putnam indispensability argument which concludes that there are mathematical objects. Second, it seems inconsistent to affirm that 2+2=4 is objectively true but deny that there are numbers. In this paper, I resolve both of these seeming inconsistencies. To the first, I present a novel interpretation of Putnam's indispensability argument that departs radically from the Quine-Putnam version. To the second, I introduce a new theory of metaphysical commitment.
Title Redacted. Under Review.
In metaphysics of science, one question is what ontological commitments are incurred by our best scientific theories. While it is natural to think that one is ontologically committed to anything that is appealed to in the theory, the weasel instead thinks that they can affirm some theory that appeals to Xs and then “prune away” commitment to Xs. The weasel's strategy crucially relies on the practice of linguistic subtraction---when in ordinary speech we subtract away some of what we say. In this paper, I provide a purely pragmatic theory for determining when an instance of linguistic subtraction is permissible or felicitous. I then apply my theory to three cases of interest in metaphysics of science.